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Abstract
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions on vertical integration/separation. The
key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the ¯nal products of the local
downstream monopolists. Depending on their cost structure, downstream ¯rms' decisions on vertical
separation can be both strategic complements and strategic substitutes. As a result, the equilibrium
number of vertically integrated ¯rms depends on the cost structure. When the local downstream
monopolists merge, vertical separation tends to appear in equilibrium. When an upstream ¯rm can
price discriminate, the downstream ¯rms vertically separate. When the downstream ¯rms compete
with each other, vertical integration tends to appear if the degree of product di®erentiation is lower.
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1 Introduction
Determinants of vertical structure have long been discussed in the management and economics lit-
erature.1 Investigating this problem is di±cult because there can be many determinants of vertical
structure. The following re°ects the di±culty of this problem. The extent of vertical specialization
varies considerably among countries and industries (Hummels et al. (1998)). For instance, in the ap-
parel industry, some brands (The Gap, L.L. Bean, and Eddie Bauer) are distributed through vertically
integrated specialized retailers. Others (Tommy Hil¯ger and Calvin Klein) are distributed primarily on
a nonexclusive basis through department stores and other nonintegrated retailers (Gertner and Stillman
(2001)). In the assembly industries, companies in Western European countries are less integrated than
those in the US, but they are still far more integrated than those in Japan. There are also signi¯cant
di®erences in vertical industry structure among individual European economies (Hemmert (1999)). We
therefore think that providing an analytic framework to investigate this problem is important from the
viewpoints of management and economics.
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation (integration) and show
several results that have not been explained in previous research (we mention the di®erence between
this model and those in related previous studies below). The key feature of this model is that more than
one input is required for the ¯nal products of the local downstream monopolists.2 The model can be
applied to many industries. For instance, in the aircraft industry, two major ¯rms, Airbus and Boeing,
rely heavily on ¯rm-speci¯c inputs (e.g., engines, wings, horizontal stabilizers) produced by independent
1 Macher and Mowery (2004) clearly summarize the research on the relation between vertical specialization and industry
structure.
2 This setting is related to models with complementary suppliers (Economides and Salop (1992), Nalebu® (2000),
Baldwin and Woodard (2007), Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2007), and Maruyama and Minamikawa (2009)). These papers
discuss how mergers among complementary suppliers appear and/or how these mergers change equilibrium outcomes.
Such complementary suppliers provide their products directly to consumers. This setting is quite di®erent from ours.
Note that the meaning of the term `vertical integration' in these papers is di®erent from that in our paper. Although a
merger among complementary suppliers is called `vertical integration' in these papers, in our model the term indicates a
merger between an upstream and a downstream ¯rm.
2
manufacturers, and then sell their aircraft to airline companies, which are the ¯nal customers (Beelaerts
van Blokland et al. (2008)).
The model structure is as follows. There are two independent local downstream monopolists D1 and
D2 that use two inputs: A, and either B1 or B2.3 The inputs are produced by an independent upstream
supplier A and a production unit inside the downstream ¯rm Di (i = 1; 2). The nondiscriminatory
wholesale price of input A is unilaterally determined by supplier A.4 To produce a ¯nal product, Di
needs ci units of input A, and one unit of input B (i = 1; 2). D1 is more e±cient than D2, that is,
c2 > c1. In this model, c2=c1 represents the e±ciency di®erence between the downstream ¯rms. Under
this condition, we consider four cases: (1) both downstream ¯rms produce units of input B, (2) both
downstream ¯rms separate from their input production units, and (3,4) one of the downstream ¯rms
separates from its input production unit. The separated unit (supplier Bi) supplies to the downstream
¯rm Di to maximize its own pro¯t (i = 1; 2).5
[Figure 1 here]
We show that depending on the production technologies of the downstream ¯rms (c2=c1), the follow-
ing three situations concerning the vertical structures of the downstream ¯rms appear: both downstream
¯rms vertically integrate or neither do when c2=c1 is small; only the e±cient downstream ¯rm vertically
integrates when c2=c1 is large. In this model, depending on the e±ciency di®erence, decisions on vertical
integration can be both strategic complements and strategic substitutes.
This result is related to Buehler and Schmutzler (2005), who examine the reasons that asymmetric
vertical structures are established and that integrated ¯rms tend to be large in many industries.6 Using
a reduced-form successive Cournot model (see Salinger (1988)), they show the two following results:
3 To discuss decisions of vertical integration, Laussel (2008) and Matsushima and Mizuno (2009) provide models with
multiple inputs. In these two papers, there is only one downstream ¯rm that determines its vertical structure.
4 In Section 5, we brie°y discuss price discrimination by suppler A.
5 We assume that the downstream ¯rm cannot merge with supplier A. A more detailed discussion of the assumption
is provided in Section 2.
6 Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) provide several examples related to asymmetric vertical structures.
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(1) there may be asymmetric equilibria where only one of the symmetric ¯rms vertically integrates; and
(2) e±cient ¯rms are more likely to integrate when downstream ¯rms di®er with respect to their initial
e±ciency levels.7 The latter result suggests that large ¯rms are more likely to integrate vertically.8
Our paper contributes to the literature on vertical integration. First, we provide a market structure
with the following feature: depending on the cost structure of downstream ¯rms, the downstream ¯rms'
decisions on vertical separation can be both strategic complements and strategic substitutes, whereas
vertical integration decisions of downstream ¯rms in Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) are strategic sub-
stitutes. As a result, one of our models can derive the following three situations concerning the vertical
structures of the downstream ¯rms: both downstream ¯rms vertically integrate and no downstream
¯rm vertically integrates when the decisions on vertical integration are strategic complements; only one
downstream ¯rm vertically integrates when the decisions on vertical integration are strategic substi-
tutes.9 Second, our model shows that downstream competition in itself is not essential in decisions
of vertical integration/separation. In our model, the two downstream ¯rms are local monopolists and
procure their inputs from a common supplier.10 This feature of our model is quite di®erent from those
of the previous studies.
We extend the basic model in several directions. First, we consider a downstream merger. When the
downstream ¯rms merge, full integration does not appear in equilibrium but rather vertical separation
tends to do so. This tendency reduces social welfare. This property can explain why merged ¯rms
tend to spin o® their previously integrated supplier divisions. For instance, in the late 1990s, Mercedes
Benz and Chrysler merged and then restructured their supplier relations around a minimum number of
7 Linnemer (2003) and Dufeu (2004) also discuss vertical integration under Cournot competition.
8 Several papers also derive asymmetric equilibria related to vertical integration. See Ordover et al. (1990), Gaudet
and Long (1996), Abiru et al. (1998), Choi and Yi (2000), Church and Gandal (2000), Chen (2001), Elberfeld (2002),
Jensen (2003), and Matsushima (2004, 2009).
9 Using a Hotelling linear city model, Matsushima (2009) also shows these three vertical structures, which are a®ected
by exogenous parameters. The mechanism used to derive those results is quite di®erent from ours. In Matsushima (2009),
vertical integration a®ects the locations of downstream ¯rms in the Hotelling linear city, and the locations a®ect decisions
on vertical integration.
10 In Section 6, we brie°y discuss the strategic interaction between the downstream ¯rms.
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full-service-development and logistics partners (Olin et al. (1999)). To our knowledge, in the literature
of industrial organization, the relation between a downstream merger and vertical structure has not
been discussed (we brie°y mention this in Section 4).
Second, we allow supplier A to price discriminate. This is related to the literature of input price
discrimination (De Graba (1990), Yoshida (2000), Inderst and Valletti (2009)). We show that both
downstream ¯rms vertically separate when supplier A price discriminates. As a result, allowing price
discrimination reduces social welfare. Third, we investigate the case in which the downstream ¯rms com-
pete. We show that the downstream ¯rms tend to integrate when the degree of product di®erentiation
is lower.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. Section 3
presents the results. Sections 4, 5, and 6 extend the basic model. Section 4 discusses the case of
downstream merger. Section 5 discusses the case of input price discrimination. Section 6 introduces
downstream market competition into the basic model. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Consider two independent downstream markets. In each market, there is a downstream ¯rm that uses
two inputs, A and B. The two inputs are produced by a common upstream supplier A and a production
unit within each downstream ¯rm i (i = 1; 2). We call the internal production unit Bi (i = 1; 2). To
simplify the analysis, we assume that the common wholesale price of input A is unilaterally determined
by the supplier. In each market, the demand for the product is linear:
pi = 1¡Qi; (1)
where pi is the market price, and Qi is the output supplied by the downstream ¯rm Di (i = 1; 2).
An initial simplifying assumption is that the downstream ¯rms are located in separate geographic
markets. Thus, the downstream ¯rms compete for inputs from upstream supplier A, and upstream
suppliers indirectly compete to supply them but downstream ¯rms do not compete directly with one
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another. This assumption clari¯es the mechanism behind the main results. Thus, having built intuition
and analysis based on an independent ¯nal good market assumption, we will (in Section 4) amend our
analysis to include head-to-head competition between downstream ¯rms.
We consider two cases concerning production technologies. (i) Downstream ¯rm i produces a unit of
¯nal product using ci units of input A and one unit of input Bi. (ii) Downstream ¯rm i produces a unit
of ¯nal product using one unit of input A and ci units of input Bi. Hence, each production technology
is denoted by:
case (i): Qi = minfqA=ci; qBig; (2)
case (ii): Qi = minfqA; qBi=cig; (3)
where qi is the amount of input j (j = A;Bi) and ci is a positive constant (i = 1; 2). Each downstream
¯rm uses Leontief production technology. No ¯rm incurs an additional marginal cost for a unit of
product except for the input prices set by the suppliers. Per unit production cost of Di (wi, i = 1; 2) is
written by (wBi = 0 if Di and Bi are not separated)
case (i): wi = ciwA + wBi; (4)
case (ii): wi = wA + ciwBi: (5)
To discuss the decisions on vertical separation, we must consider the following three cases: (1) both
downstream ¯rms separate from their respective input production units (full separation), (2) only one
downstream ¯rm separates (partial separation), and (3) no downstream ¯rm separates (no separation).
We assume that the downstream ¯rm cannot merge with ¯rm A. We now explain why the down-
stream ¯rm cannot merge with ¯rm A. In general, downstream ¯rms compete, and usually procure their
inputs from common suppliers (Ahmadjian and Lincoln (2001)). In this situation, a vertical merger be-
tween ¯rm A and a downstream ¯rm tends to be prohibited by antitrust authorities because of the
foreclosure problem (Rey and Tirole (2007)). Although the two markets are independent in our model,
our setting is also applicable to the case in which two markets are interdependent and represented by
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standard di®erentiated inverse demand functions pi = 1 ¡ Qi ¡ °Qj (i = 1; 2, i 6= j). Therefore, this
assumption is plausible.
To develop an equilibrium theory of vertical integration, I follow the method of Pepall et al. (2004,
p. 439) and analyze a stage game. The game runs as follows. First, each downstream ¯rm determines
whether to separate from its input unit. Second, given the decisions of the downstream ¯rms, the
supplier(s) determine the wholesale price(s). Third, given the wholesale price(s), each downstream ¯rm
sets the quantity it supplies.
3 Results
We now calculate two cases concerning production technologies.
3.1 Case (i): Qi = minfqA=ci; qBig
Given the wholesale prices wA, wB1, and wB2, the maximization problem of Di is:
max
Qi
(1¡Qi ¡ ciwA ¡ wBi)Qi:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
Qi =
1¡ ciwA ¡ wBi
2
; ¼Di =
(1¡ ciwA ¡ wBi)2
4
:
As mentioned earlier, the wholesale prices are unilaterally determined by the suppliers. The maxi-
mization problems of suppliers A and Bi are:
max
wA
wA(c1Q1 + c2Q2) ) max
wA
wA
2X
i=1
ci
1¡ ciwA ¡ wBi
2
;
max
wBi
wBi
1¡ ciwA ¡ wBi
2
; (i = 1; 2):
Here we have three cases of vertical structure: (1) full separation, (2) partial separation, and (3) no
separation. Taking into account that wBi = 0 if ¯rm i does not separate from Bi, we derive the
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¯rst-order condition(s) of the supplier(s). These condition(s) lead to:
(1) wSSA =
c1 + c2
3(c21 + c
2
2)
; wSSBi =
2c2i ¡ cicj + 3c2j
6(c21 + c
2
2)
;
¼SSDi =
(2c2i ¡ cicj + 3c2j )2
144(c21 + c
2
2)2
; ¼SSBi =
(2c2i ¡ cicj + 3c2j )2
72(c21 + c
2
2)2
;
(2a) wSIA =
c1 + 2c2
3c21 + 4c
2
2
; wSIB1 =
c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22
3c21 + 4c
2
2
;
¼SID1 =
(c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22)2
4(3c21 + 4c
2
2)2
; ¼SIB1 =
(c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22)2
2(3c21 + 4c
2
2)2
; ¼SID2 =
(3c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22)2
4(3c21 + 4c
2
2)2
;
(2b) wISA =
2c1 + c2
4c21 + 3c
2
2
; wISB2 =
2c21 ¡ c1c2 + c22
4c21 + 3c
2
2
;
¼ISD1 =
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + 3c22)2
4(4c21 + 3c
2
2)2
; ¼ISD2 =
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + c22)2
4(4c21 + 3c
2
2)2
; ¼ISB2 =
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + c22)2
2(4c21 + 3c
2
2)2
;
(3) wIIA =
c1 + c2
2(c21 + c
2
2)
; ¼IID1 =
(c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22)2
16(c21 + c
2
2)2
; ¼IID2 =
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + c22)2
16(c21 + c
2
2)2
;
where the superscript SS denotes the full-separation setting; the superscript SI (resp. IS) denotes that
D1 (resp. D2) separates and D2 (resp. D1) integrates; the superscript II denotes the no-separation
setting.
From the above results, we can make the following payo® matrix related to the ¯rst-stage decisions
of the downstream ¯rms.
D1/D2 I S
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + c22)2
16(c21 + c
2
2)2
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + c22)2
4(4c21 + 3c
2
2)2
+
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + c22)2
2(4c21 + 3c
2
2)2
I
(c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22)2
16(c21 + c
2
2)2
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + 3c22)2
4(4c21 + 3c
2
2)2
(3c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22)2
4(3c21 + 4c
2
2)2
(2c22 ¡ c1c2 + 3c21)2
144(c21 + c
2
2)2
+
(2c22 ¡ c1c2 + 3c21)2
72(c21 + c
2
2)2
S
(c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22)2
4(3c21 + 4c
2
2)2
+
(c21 ¡ c1c2 + 2c22)2
2(3c21 + 4c
2
2)2
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + 3c22)2
144(c21 + c
2
2)2
+
(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + 3c22)2
72(c21 + c
2
2)2
From the payo® matrix, we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 D1 (resp. D2) vertically separates but D2 (resp. D1) does not separate vertically in
equilibrium if c2 · (3=4)1=4c1 ' 0:9306c1 (resp. c2 ¸ (4=3)1=4c1 ' 1:0746c1). D1 and D2 both vertically
separate or neither do in equilibrium if (3=4)1=4c1 · c2 · (4=3)1=4c1.
The di®erence between the e±ciencies of their production technologies is large (the absolute value of
jc2=c1 ¡ 1j is large), and the relatively ine±cient ¯rm separates from its production unit B.
Basically, vertical separation induces supplier A to lower its wholesale price wA. This is because sup-
plier A faces the di±culty of fully exerting monopoly power because of the additional double marginaliza-
tion problem caused by the separated unit (Cournot (1838) and Sonnenschein (1968)). This diminishes
the pro¯t of supplier A, and a portion of the monopoly pro¯t of supplier A is transferred to supplier B
through competition between the suppliers. Note that because vertical separation enhances the stan-
dard double marginalization problem, it diminishes the quantity supplied by the separated downstream
¯rm.
The ratio of the marginal costs c2=c1 a®ects the extent to which vertical separation decreases the
wholesale price of supplier A (wA). We can easily show that w
jk
A (j; k 2 fI; Sg) decreases with ci
given that ci ¸ cj (i = 1; 2; j 6= i). This is because the derived demand of supplier A becomes more
elastic as the value of ci increases. As a result, a higher value of ci induces supplier A to lower its
wholesale price. Now suppose that ¯rm 1 is more e±cient without loss of generality (c1 < c2). Vertical
separation by ¯rm 1 does not similarly decrease the wholesale price of supplier A because the price level
is already low. We can easily check this fact with the following calculus: @wSSA =@c2 < 0, @w
IS
A =@c2 < 0,
and @(wISA ¡ wSSA )=@c2 < 0.11 This calculus means that the relatively e±cient downstream ¯rm does
not su®er such an increase in wA caused by its integration decision given that both downstream ¯rms
separate from their input units. Therefore, SS does not appear if c2=c1 is su±ciently large.
To discuss the incentive of the ine±cient downstream ¯rm, we now mention the relations among
11 For any c2 ¸ c1,
@(wISA ¡ wSSA )
@c2
=
@
@c2

c1(2c21 ¡ c1c2 + 3c22)
3(c21 + c
2
2)(4c
2
1 + 3c
2
2)

= ¡ c1(4c
4
1(c1 + c2) + c
2
1c
2
2(24c2 ¡ 7c1) + 9c42(2c2 ¡ c1))
3(c1 + c2)2(4c1 + 3c2)2
< 0:
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wA, wBi, and ci. We have already mentioned that w
jk
A (j; k 2 fI; Sg) decreases with ci if ci ¸ cj
(i = 1; 2; j 6= i). We have also mentioned that a lower wA allows separated suppliers Bi to set higher
prices wBi (i = 1; 2), and that the converse also holds. For ¯rm i, as the e±ciency of ¯rm j (j 6= i)
improves, the wholesale price set by Bi decreases because of the increase in wA. This pricing behavior
by Bi mitigates the negative e®ect of the additional double marginalization problem caused by vertical
separation. This e®ect induces the ine±cient downstream ¯rm to separate from its input unit. From
the discussion, we can conclude that only the ine±cient downstream ¯rm i separates from its input unit
if ci=cj is large.
3.2 Case (ii): Qi = minfqA; qBi=cig
Given the wholesale prices wA, wB1, and wB2, the maximization problem of Di is:
max
Qi
(1¡Qi ¡ wA ¡ ciwBi)Qi:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
Qi =
1¡ wA ¡ ciwBi
2
; ¼Di =
(1¡ wA ¡ ciwBi)2
4
:
As mentioned earlier, the wholesale prices are unilaterally determined by the suppliers. The maxi-
mization problems of supplier A and Bi are:
max
wA
wA
2X
i=1
1¡ wA ¡ ciwBi
2
; max
wBi
wBici
1¡ wA ¡ ciwBi
2
:
As in case (i), we have three cases of vertical structure: (1) full separation, (2) partial separation, and
(3) no separation. Taking into account that wBi = 0 if ¯rm i does not separate from Bi, we derive the
¯rst-order condition(s) of the supplier(s). These condition(s) lead to:
(1) wSSA =
1
3
; wSSBi =
1
3ci
; ¼SSDi =
1
36
; ¼SSBi =
1
18
;
(2a) wSIA =
3
7
; wSIB1 =
2
7c1
; ¼SID1 =
1
49
; ¼SIB1 =
2
49
; ¼SID2 =
4
49
;
(2b) wISA =
3
7
; wISB2 =
2
7c2
; ¼ISD1 =
4
49
; ¼ISD2 =
1
49
; ¼ISB2 =
2
49
;
(3) wIIA =
1
2
; ¼IIDi =
1
16
;
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where the superscript SS denotes the full-separation setting; the superscript SI (resp. IS) denotes that
D1 (resp. D2) separates and D2 (resp. D1) integrates; and the superscript II denotes the no-separation
setting.
From the above results, we can make the following payo® matrix related to the ¯rst stage decisions
of the downstream ¯rms.
D1/D2 I S
1
16
1
49
+
2
49
I
1
16
4
49
4
49
1
36
+
1
18
S
1
49
+
2
49
1
36
+
1
18
From the payo® matrix, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For any c1 and c2, both D1 and D2 separate or neither separates in equilibrium.
Note that in this setting, ci does not a®ect the pro¯tability of ¯rm i (i = 1; 2). The strategic interaction
between the downstream ¯rms through supplier A exists. The logic behind the proposition is similar to
that in the previous model.
4 Downstream merger
We now consider the case in which the independent downstream ¯rms merge. We now assume that
the e±ciencies of the two downstream ¯rms do not change even though they merge (we brie°y discuss
the case in which the e±ciencies are equalized by the merger). At ¯rst glance, under the assumption,
this merger does not a®ect the welfare property in the markets because the downstream ¯rms do not
compete. As explained below, this intuition is not true, but the merger tends to decrease social welfare.
11
The timing of the game is as follows. Given that the downstream ¯rms merge, the merged ¯rm
determines its vertical structure. After that, each supplier sets its wholesale price. Finally, the merged
¯rm determines its quantities supplied to the two markets.
We now check the decision of the merged downstream ¯rm on its vertical structure. Anticipating
the wholesale price(s) set by the supplier(s) and the quantities it supplies, the merged ¯rm determines
its vertical structure. We have already derived the pro¯ts under each vertical structure in the previous
section. Without loss of generality, we assume that c2 ¸ c1. Using the pro¯ts derived in the previous
section, we have the following proposition concerning the vertical structure of the merged downstream
¯rm.
Proposition 3 The merged downstream ¯rm separates both input units B1 and B2 if and only if
1 · c2=c1 · 2; and the merged downstream ¯rm separates only input unit B2 if and only if c2=c1 ¸ 2.
The merged downstream ¯rm tends to separate its input units vertically. The following ¯gure shows
the comparison between the two cases. Because vertical separation enhances the problem of double
marginalization, the decision of the merged ¯rm is harmful from the viewpoint of social surplus.
[Figure 2 here]
When the downstream ¯rms are independent, each considers only its own pro¯t, even though a vertical
separation by a downstream ¯rm harms another downstream ¯rm because of the increase in the wholesale
price of supplier A. On the other hand, the merged ¯rm internalizes the negative e®ect of vertical
separation. Therefore, the merged ¯rm tends to separate vertically. When the e±ciency levels of the
merged downstream units are equalized, the merged ¯rm always separates both input units because
c2=c1 = 1.
We can interpret the result as follows. A larger downstream ¯rm tends to separate from its production
units. In other words, a large ¯rm concentrates its resources on its ¯nal product activities, and to do
so, it separates from its production units. This result may shed light on the discussion concerning the
optimal vertical and horizontal scope of the ¯rm as mentioned in the introduction.
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We now brie°y mention the relation between previous research and our paper. Because vertically
related industries have recently attracted considerable attention from policymakers, antitrust authorities
and economists, several researchers investigate downstream mergers with vertical relations (Horn and
Wolinsky (1988), Ziss (1995), Symeonidis (in press) and references therein). Our paper discusses the
relation between a downstream merger and the vertical structure in the market. This has not been
discussed in previous research.12
5 Price discrimination
We now consider the case in which supplier A is able to price discriminate. When it does so, the two
markets become independent because the strategic interaction through the supplier A disappears. As
in the previous section, we calculate two cases concerning production technologies.
5.1 Case (i): Qi = minfqA=ci; qBig
We consider market i. Given the wholesale prices wAi and wBi, the maximization problem of Di is:
max
Qi
(1¡Qi ¡ ciwAi ¡ wBi)Qi:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
Qi =
1¡ ciwAi ¡ wBi
2
; ¼Di =
(1¡ ciwAi ¡ wBi)2
4
:
As mentioned earlier, the wholesale prices are unilaterally determined by the suppliers. The maximiza-
tion problems of suppliers A and Bi are:
max
wAi
wAici
1¡ ciwAi ¡ wBi
2
; max
wBi
wBi
1¡ ciwAi ¡ wBi
2
:
Here, we have two cases of vertical structure: (1) vertical separation, and (2) no separation. Taking
into account that wBi = 0 if ¯rm i does not separate from Bi, we derive the ¯rst-order condition(s) of
12 Ziss (2007) discusses the relation between downstream mergers and the vertical structure within ¯rms. In his model,
however, the decision of vertical separation is not discussed.
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the supplier(s). These condition(s) lead to:
(1) wSAi =
1
3ci
; wSBi =
1
3
; ¼SDi =
1
36
; ¼SBi =
1
18
;
(2) wIAi =
1
2ci
; ¼IDi =
1
16
;
where the superscript S denotes the vertical separation setting; and the superscript I denotes the
no-separation setting. From the above results, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For any ci, Di vertically separates from Bi (i = 1; 2).
This case is simple. To reduce wAi, downstream Di separates from its input unit Bi (i = 1; 2). In
this case, the positive e®ect caused by the decrease in wAi dominates the negative e®ect caused by the
additional double marginalization problem.
We now compare the consumer and the social surplus in the two cases. The consumer surplus and
the social surplus in the case where supplier A price discriminates are:
CSD =
1
36
; SWD =
11
36
:
When supplier A does not price discriminate, if each Di vertically separates from Bi (note that this
case is the worst among the three vertical structures), the consumer surplus and the social surplus are:
CSU =
13c21 ¡ 10c1c2 + 13c22
288(c21 + c
2
2)
; SWU =
107c21 ¡ 38c1c2 + 107c22
288(c21 + c
2
2)
:
The di®erences between them are:
CSU ¡ CSD = 5(c1 ¡ c2)
2
288(c21 + c
2
2)
¸ 0; SWU ¡ SWD = 19(c1 ¡ c2)
2
288(c21 + c
2
2)
¸ 0:
In this setting, allowing price discrimination is harmful from the viewpoints of consumer and social
welfare.
5.2 Case (ii): Qi = minfqA; qBi=cig
Given the wholesale prices wAi and wBi, the maximization problem of Di is:
max
Qi
(1¡Qi ¡ wAi ¡ ciwBi)Qi:
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The ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
Qi =
1¡ wAi ¡ ciwBi
2
; ¼Di =
(1¡ wAi ¡ ciwBi)2
4
:
As mentioned earlier, the wholesale prices are unilaterally determined by the suppliers. The maxi-
mization problems of suppliers A and Bi are:
max
wAi
wAi
1¡ wAi ¡ ciwBi
2
; max
wBi
wBici
1¡ wAi ¡ ciwBi
2
:
As in case (i), we have two cases of vertical structure: (1) vertical separation, and (2) no separation. Tak-
ing into account that wBi = 0 if ¯rm i does not separate from Bi, we derive the ¯rst-order condition(s)
of the supplier(s). These condition(s) lead to:
(1) wSAi =
1
3
; wSBi =
1
3ci
; ¼SDi =
1
36
; ¼SBi =
1
18
;
(2) wIIAi =
1
2
; ¼IDi =
1
16
;
where the superscript S denotes the full separation setting; and the superscript I denotes the no-
separation setting. From the above results, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For any ci, Di vertically separates from Bi (i = 1; 2).
When supplier A does not price discriminate, vertical integration can appear in equilibrium. In this
model, vertical separation always appears in equilibrium. This never improves social welfare.
6 Market competition
To analyze the e®ect of competition in the downstream market, we assume the di®erentiated demand
is pi = 1¡Qi ¡ °Qj , where pi is the retail price of downstream ¯rm i, Qi (resp. Qj) is the amount of
product sold by downstream ¯rm i (resp. j), and ° 2 [0; 1] denotes a degree of product di®erentiation.
In the same way as in the previous sections, we calculate two cases.
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6.1 Case (i): Q = minfqA=ci; qBig
Given the wholesale prices wA, wB1, and wB2, the maximization problem of Di is:
max
Qi
(1¡Qi ¡ °Qj ¡ ciwA ¡ wBi)Qi:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
Qi =
2(1¡ ciwA ¡ wBi)¡ °(1¡ cjwA ¡ wBj)
(2¡ °)(2 + °) ; ¼Di =
·
2(1¡ ciwA ¡ wBi)¡ °(1¡ cjwA ¡ wBj)
(2¡ °)(2 + °)
¸2
;
where i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. As mentioned earlier, the wholesale prices are unilaterally determined by
the suppliers. The maximization problems of suppliers A and Bi are:
max
wA
wA(c1Q1 + c2Q2) ) max
wA
wA
2X
i=1
ci
2(1¡ ciwA ¡ wBi)¡ °(1¡ cjwA ¡ wBj)
(2¡ °)(2 + °) ;
max
wBi
wBi
2(1¡ ciwA ¡ wBi)¡ °(1¡ cjwA ¡ wBj)
(2¡ °)(2 + °) ; (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j):
Here, we have three cases: (1) full separation, (2) partial separation, and (3) no separation. Taking
into account that wBi = 0 if ¯rm i does not separate from Bi, we derive the ¯rst-order condition(s) of
the supplier(s). Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, we have the pro¯ts of the ¯rms. Using the result, we
can ascertain what vertical structure appears in equilibrium as in the previous sections. We have the
following proposition (¢i (i = 1; 2; 3; 4) is de¯ned in the Appendix).
Proposition 6 D1 (resp. D2) vertically separates but D2 (resp. D1) does not in equilibrium if ¢2 is
plus (resp. ¢4 is plus). D1 and D2 vertically separate or neither of them do in equilibrium if ¢1 is
plus, ¢2 is minus, ¢3 is plus, and ¢4 is minus. D1 and D2 do not vertically separate in equilibrium,
otherwise.
This proposition is summarized in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 here]
We have already explained the intuition behind the result that ° = 0. In this setting, we add the
competition between the downstream ¯rms. In this competitive environment, a lower procurement
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cost is an advantage for a downstream ¯rm. To lower its procurement cost, downstream ¯rm i has
an incentive not to separate from its input unit Bi. This tendency becomes strong as the degree of
competition that is represented by ° increases. Therefore, as the value of ° increases, the range of (I; I)
(none of the downstream ¯rms separates from its input unit) is enlarged.
6.2 Case (ii): Qi = minfqA; qBi=cig
Given the wholesale price wA, wB1, and wB2, the maximization problem of Di is:
max
Qi
(1¡Qi ¡ °Qj ¡ wA ¡ ciwBi)Qi:
The ¯rst-order condition leads to:
Qi =
2(1¡ wA ¡ ciwBi)¡ °(1¡ wA ¡ cjwBj)
(2¡ °)(2 + °) ; ¼Di =
·
2(1¡ wA ¡ ciwBi)¡ °(1¡ wA ¡ cjwBj)
(2¡ °)(2 + °)
¸2
:
As mentioned earlier, the wholesale prices are unilaterally determined by the suppliers. The maxi-
mization problems of suppliers A and Bi are:
max
wA
wA
2X
i=1
2(1¡ wA ¡ ciwBi)¡ °(1¡ wA ¡ cjwBj)
(2¡ °)(2 + °) ;
max
wBi
wBiciQi ) max
wBi
wBici
2(1¡ wA ¡ ciwBi)¡ °(1¡ wA ¡ cjwBj)
(2¡ °)(2 + °) ; (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j):
Here, we have three cases: (1) full separation, (2) partial separation, and (3) no separation. Considering
that wBi = 0 if ¯rm i does not separate from Bi, we derive the ¯rst-order condition(s) of the supplier(s).
As in the previous subsection, we derive the equilibrium pro¯ts in each vertical structure. From the
result, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Both D1 and D2 separate or neither of them separates in equilibrium if ° · 0:3708.
Both D1 and D2 integrate in equilibrium if ° > 0:3708.
7 Concluding remarks
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions of vertical separation. The key feature of this model
is that more than one input is required for the ¯nal products of the local downstream monopolists. De-
pending on the cost structure of the downstream ¯rms, their decisions on vertical separation can be both
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strategic complements and strategic substitutes. As a result, one of our models can derive the following
three situations concerning the vertical structures of the downstream ¯rms: both downstream ¯rms
vertically integrate; no downstream ¯rm vertically integrates when the decisions on vertical integration
are strategic complements; and only one downstream ¯rm vertically integrates when the decisions on
vertical integration are strategic substitutes. Our model also shows that downstream competition in
itself is not essential in decisions of vertical integration/separation. In our model, the two downstream
¯rms are local monopolists and procure their inputs from a common supplier. These features of our
model are quite di®erent from those of previous studies.
We have extended the basic model in several directions. First, we consider a downstream merger.
When the downstream ¯rms merge, full integration does not appear in equilibrium but rather vertical
separation tends to appear. This tendency reduces social welfare. Second, we allow a common supplier
to price discriminate. We show that both downstream ¯rms vertically separate when the common
supplier price discriminates. As a result, allowing price discrimination reduces social welfare. Third, we
investigate the case in which the downstream ¯rms compete. We show that the downstream ¯rms tend
to integrate when the degree of product di®erentiation is lower.
In this paper, we have assumed that the production technology of downstream ¯rms is of the Leontief
type. That is, two inputs are perfectly complementary. Although this assumption simpli¯es the analyses
executed here, it may be restrictive. Incorporating other assumptions of the production technology into
our basic model is a consideration for future research. We have set the number of downstream ¯rms at
two in this paper. When the number of downstream ¯rms is more than two, the strategic interaction
among the downstream ¯rms and the common supplier would be more complicated. This is also a
signi¯cant topic for future research.
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Appendix
We now discuss the results in Section 6.
Case (i) Solving the optimization problem(s) of the supplier(s), we have the following result (we now
set c = c2=c1 without loss of generality):
(1) wSSA =
(c1 + c2)(8¡ 2° ¡ °2)
2(c21 + c
2
2)(12¡ °2)¡ c1c2°(20¡ °)
;
wSSBi =
(2¡ °)[c2i (4 + °) + 2c2j (3 + °)¡ cicj(2 + 5° + °2)]
2(c2i + c
2
j )(12¡ °2)¡ cicj°(20¡ °2)
;
¼SSD1 + ¼
SS
B1 =
2(6¡ °2)(4¡ 2c+ 6c2 + ° ¡ 5c° + 2c2° ¡ c°2)2
(2 + °)2(24 + 24c2 ¡ 20c° ¡ 2°2 ¡ 2c2°2 + c°3)2 ;
¼SSD2 + ¼
SS
B2 =
2(6¡ °)(6¡ 2c+ 4c2 + 2° ¡ 5c° + c2° ¡ c°2)2
(2 + °)2(24 + 24c2 ¡ 20c° ¡ 2°2 ¡ 2c2°2 + c°3)2 ;
(2a) wSIA =
(2¡ °)[2c1 + c2(4 + °)]
12c21 + c
2
2(16¡ °2)¡ 12c1c2°
; wSIB1 =
(2¡ °)[c1c2(2 + 3°)¡ 2c21 ¡ 2c22(4 + °)]
12c21 + c
2
2(16¡ °2)¡ 12c1c2°
;
¼SID1 + ¼
SI
B1 =
2(2¡ 2c+ 4c2 ¡ 3c° + c2°)2(6¡ °2)
(2 + °)2(12 + 16c2 ¡ 12c° ¡ c2°2)2 ;
¼SID2 =
4(6¡ 2c+ 4c2 + 2° ¡ 5c° + c2° ¡ c°2)2
(2 + °)2(12 + 16c2 ¡ 12c° ¡ c2°2)2 ;
(2b) wISA =
(2¡ °)[2c2 + c1(4 + °)]
12c22 + c
2
1(16¡ °2)¡ 12c1c2°
; wISB2 =
(2¡ °)[2c22 + c21(4 + °)¡ c1c2(2 + 3°)]
12c22 + c
2
1(16¡ °2)¡ 12c1c2°
;
¼ISD1 =
4(4¡ 2c+ 6c2 + ° ¡ 5c° + 2c2° ¡ c°2)2
(2 + °)2(16 + 12c2 ¡ 12c° ¡ °2)2 ;
¼ISD2 + ¼
IS
B2 =
2(4¡ 2c+ 2c2 + ° ¡ 3c°)2(6¡ °2)
(2 + °)2(16 + 12c2 ¡ 12c° ¡ °2)2 ;
(3) wIIA =
(2¡ °)(c1 + c2)
4(c21 + c
2
2 ¡ c1c2°)
;
¼IID1 =
(2¡ 2c+ 4c2 ¡ 3c° + c2°)2
16(2 + °)2(1 + c2 ¡ c°)2 ; ¼
II
D2 =
(4¡ 2c+ 2c2 + ° ¡ 3c°)2
16(2 + °)2(1 + c2 ¡ c°)2 :
From the above result, we can make the following payo® matrix related to the ¯rst-stage decisions of
the downstream ¯rms.
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D1/D2 I S
¼IID2 ¼
IS
D2 + ¼
IS
B2
I
¼IID1 ¼
IS
D1
¼SID2 ¼
SS
D2 + ¼
SS
B2
S
¼SID1 + ¼
SI
B1 ¼
SS
D1 + ¼
SS
B1
To derive Proposition 6, we have to check the following four symbols ¢i (i = 1; 2; 3; 4).
Sign[(¼SSD1 + ¼
SS
B1)¡ ¼ISD1] = Sign[384¡ 256°2 + 30°4 ¡ °6 + c(¡384° + 272°3 ¡ 16°5)
+ c2(¡80°2 ¡ 56°4 ¡ 2°6) + c3(192° + 32°3 + 8°5) + c4(¡288 + 48°2 ¡ 8°4)] ´ ¢1;
Sign[(¼SID1 + ¼
SI
B1)¡ ¼IID1] = Sign[48¡ 32°2 + c(¡96° + 64°3)
+ c2(8°2 ¡ 32°4) + 40c3°3 + c4(¡64¡ °4)] ´ ¢2;
Sign[(¼SSD2 + ¼
SS
B2)¡ ¼SID2] = Sign[¡288 + 48°2 ¡ 8°4 + c(192° + 32°3 + 8°5)
+ c2(¡80°2 ¡ 56°4 ¡ 2°6) + c3(¡384° + 272°3 ¡ 16°5)
+ c4(384¡ 256°2 + 30°4 ¡ °6)] ´ ¢3;
Sign[(¼ISD2 + ¼
IS
B2)¡ ¼IID2] = Sign[¡64¡ °4 + 40c°3
+ c2(8°2 ¡ 32°4) + c3(¡96° + 64°3) + c4(48¡ 32°2)] ´ ¢4:
Case (ii) Solving the optimization problem(s) of the supplier(s), we have the following result:
(1) wSSA =
2
6¡ ° ; w
SS
Bi =
2¡ °
ci(6¡ °) ; ¼
SS
Di + ¼
SS
Bi =
2(6¡ °)
(6¡ °)2(2 + °)2 ;
(2a)wSIA =
6 + °
14 + °
; wSIB1 =
4¡ 2°
c1(14 + °)
; ¼SID1 + ¼
SI
B1 =
8(6¡ °)
(2 + °)2(14 + °)2
; ¼SID2 =
4(4 + °)
(2 + °)2(14 + °)2
;
(2b)wISA =
6 + °
14 + °
; wISB2 =
4¡ 2°
c2(14 + °)
; ¼ISD1 =
4(4 + °)2
(2 + °)2(14 + °)2
; ¼ISD2 + ¼
IS
B2 =
8(6¡ °2)
(2 + °)2(14 + °)2
;
(3) wIIA =
1
2
; ¼IIDi =
1
4(2 + °)2
:
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From the above results, we can make the following payo® matrix related to the ¯rst-stage decisions of
the downstream ¯rms.
D1/D2 I S
1
4(2 + °)2
8(6¡ °2)
(2 + °)2(14 + °)2
I
1
4(2 + °)2
4(4 + °)2
(2 + °)2(14 + °)2
4(4 + °)
(2 + °)2(14 + °)2
2(6¡ °)
(6¡ °)2(2 + °)2
S
8(6¡ °)
(2 + °)2(14 + °)2
2(6¡ °)
(6¡ °)2(2 + °)2
From the payo® matrix, we have Proposition 7.
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Figure 1: Four possible vertical structures
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Figure 2: Comparison of the vertical structures in the two cases
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Figure 3: Vertical structure with downstream competition.
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